Excursus on Wittgenstein's Vision of Language

Abstract

Considering the question How do words acquire that generality upon which thought depends?, in particular: (1) What is (do we call) "learning a word", or "learning the general name of something"?, and (2) what makes a projection an appropriate or correct one? Stanley Cavell develops what he takes to be the vision of language in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. By means of a masterful application of the method of ordinary language —with its persistent appeal to concrete cases— it is shown that language is not everywhere determined by rules, nor is understanding secured through universals, there are always new contexts to be met, new needs, new relationships, new objects, new perceptions, so that language learning is never over. The "routes of initiation" are never closed. This fierce ambiguity of ordinary language —it is argued, against the traditional philosophical conception— far from being a liability that we must make up for or overcome, is precisely what gives it its power or illumination, of enriching perception.
The article contains a previous introduction by Dr. Víctor J. Krebs.