Mary's experiment: defenses and rebuttals around the argument of knowledge
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.62876/lr.vi33.3628Keywords:
experience, conscience, qualia, physicalismAbstract
In this article, I intend to address different arguments, in favor and against, Frank Jackson’s mental experiment proposed in 1982, known as the knowledge argument or Mary's Room. With this argument, Jackson attempts to support and demonstrate the intrinsic and ineffable nature of phenomenal experience, in addition to the existence and independence of non-physical properties, irreducible to physical language. The validity of the premises of the arguments and their correctness is discussed, contextually.
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