Determined to be free and responsible? Daniel Dennett's compatibilism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.62876/lr.vi039.5026Keywords:
Determinism, free will, responsability, compatibilism, naturalismAbstract
This article aims at reviewing Daniel Dennett's approach to free will, as his
position remains in force in the discussion on the subject as a perspective
solidly contrary to extreme models. To this end, we will follow Dennett's route of
criticism of such positions. The result is a compatibilist version of determinism
supported by a robust naturalism that eludes metaphysical commitments
without excluding free will, defined in original terms.
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References
Dennett, Daniel. 2003. Freedom Evolves. New York: Viking.
Dennett, Daniel. 2000. La libertad de acción. Barcelona: Paidós.
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Sagan, Carl. 1980. Cosmos. New York: Random House.
Searle, John. 1990. Mentes, cerebros y ciencia. Madrid: Cátedra.
Symons, John. 2002. On Dennett. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Von Kustchera, Franz. 1989. Fundamentos de ética. Madrid: Cátedra.
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