Thoughts surrounding the bases of philosophy of the mind
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.62876/lr.vi33.3626Keywords:
Materialism, human experience, mind-body problem, dualism, OnthologyAbstract
The main ontological accounts are analyzed with respect to the nature of human experience within the context of the philosophy of mind. On the one hand, different forms of dualism are examined by taking the irreducibility of the mental as the defining criterion. On the other hand, different forms of materialism are explored by taking as definition criterion the possibility of the reduction of the mental, as well as the possibility of its elimination. Through this analysis, I seek to clarify the implicit and explicit ontological presuppositions that determine the nature of each of the accounts.
Downloads
References
Chalmers, D.: The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996).
Clarke, D.: Descartes’s Theory of Mind, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003).
Davidson, Donald: “Mental Events”, L. Foster, J, Swanson (eds.): Experience and Theory, (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1970).
Dennett, Daniel: Consciousness Explained, (Back Bay Books, 1991).
Kim, J.: “Causation and Mental Causation”, B. McLaughlin, j. Cohen (eds.): Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, (Blackwell Publishing, 2007).
Kim, J.: “Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism”, K. Corcoran (ed.): Soul, Body and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2001).
Kim, J.: “The Non-Reductivist’s Troubles with Mental Causation”, J. Heil, A. Mele (eds.):Mental Causation, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993).
Lowe, Edward J.: “Substance Dualism: A Non-Cartesian Approach”, R. Koons, G. Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010).
Putnam, Hilary: Representation and Reality, Cáp. 5., Cambridge, MIT Press, 1988.
Rodriguez-Pereyra, G.: “Descartes’s Substance Dualism and His Independence Conception of Substance”, Journal of the History of Philosophy; vol. 46; no. 1, 2008.
Rorty, Richard: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979.
Searle, J.: The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1992, Cáp. 5.
Searle, J: “Biological Naturalism”, The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, M. Velmans, S. Schneider (eds.), (Blackwell Publishing, 2007).
Searle, J: “Why I Am Not a Property Dualist”, (Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 9, no. 12, 2002).
Searle, John: Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983).
Secada, J.: Cartesian Metaphysics. The Late Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004).
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2022 Array
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
.png)
