Critical evaluation of Bas van Fraassen's objections to the EMI

Authors

  • Roberto Miguel Azar Universidad de Buenos Aires

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.62876/lr.v0i27.3238

Keywords:

van Fraassen, scientific Realism and Antirealism , Inference towards the best explanation, self-evident assumptions

Abstract

In considering the merits of the so-called 'Inference to the Best Explanation' (IME), especially in the framework of the Realism-Antirrealism Scientific debate, the objective of this paper is to reconstruct van Fraassen's main objections to the EMI in order to evaluate them and explain those relevant assumptions that are implicit in their arguments. Thus we will arrive at the idea that these are not self-evident assumptions, so they must be demonstrated, otherwise, many of the arguments presented here are inconclusive. 

 

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References

Lipton, Peter: Inference to the Best Explanation, (London, Routledge, 1991).

Okasha, Samir: Van Fraassen’s Critique of Inference to the Best Explanation, (Great Britain, Elsevier Science Ltd.,2000).

Putnam, Hillary: Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975).

Sanders Peirce, Charles: Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, Editado por C. Harstshorne, P. Weiss y A. Burks, 1958).

Published

2017-06-10

How to Cite

Azar, R. M. (2017). Critical evaluation of Bas van Fraassen’s objections to the EMI. Lógoi. Revista De Filosofia, (27), 58–72. https://doi.org/10.62876/lr.v0i27.3238