Wittgenstein and the conceptual pluralism

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Investigaciones filosóficas, Parte II, Pasaje xii. (En lo sucesivo citaremos los pasajes de esta obra del siguiente modo: IF, II, xii.)

Peter Strawson: The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant´s Critique of Pure Reason, London, Methuen, 1966.

Philip Kitcher: Kant´s Transcendental Psychology, New York, Oxford University Press, (1990), 2011.

Rudolf Carnap: “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”, en Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic (edición ampliada), Chicago, Chicago University Press,1956.

Willar V. O. Quine: “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1953), en From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, p. 42, 1980. 6 Willar V. O. Quine: Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York, Columbia University Press, p. 40,1969.

Christopher Peacocke: A Study of Concepts, Cambridge, MIT, p. 6, 1992.

Frege, 1952: 159.

Michael P. Lynch: Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity, Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, p. 57, 1998.

OFM , §412, vii 45

OFM , §433, vii 71

IF, § 71b.

IF, § 80

No es, por ello, casual que con el ascenso del contextualismo se haya incrementado el interés por la vaguedad.

Según Hacker y Backer, en Gordon P. Backer y Peter Hacker: Wittgenstein Understanding and Meaning, Vol 1. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.

En IF, § 2

Stanley Cavel: Must we mean what we say? A book of Essays, New York, Scribner, p. 52, 1969.

Donald Davidson: Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 184, 1984. (La traducción es mía.)

Ibíd., p. 185

Peter Hacker: Wittgenstein´s Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996.

Davidson, Donald, Op. Cit., p. 197