Pensándolo bien, las intenciones irreflexivas al estilo Libet pueden ser compatibles con el libre albedrío


  • Nick Byrd Stevens Institute of Technology, NJ, USA


Palabras clave:

reflexion, intención, neurociencia, filosofía de la mente, libre albedrío


Algunos han argumentado que nuestro sentido de libre albedrío es una ilusión. Y algunos basan este escepticismo en lo que interpretan como el momento en que nos volvemos conscientes de nuestras intenciones. La evidencia sugiere que las intenciones no reflexivas se forman antes de que seamos conscientes de ellas. Y eso se supone que desafía nuestro sentido del libre albedrío. Esta inferencia puede parecer intuitiva al principio. Sin embargo, este argumento parece implicar una visión mágica del libre albedrío.  En la medida en que este no requiere magia, las intenciones no reflexivas no necesariamente socavan nuestro sentido de libre albedrío

Some have argued that our sense of free will is an illusion. And some base this free will skepticism on claims about when we become consciously aware of our intentions.  Evidence suggests that unreflective intentions form before we are conscious of them. And that is supposed to challenge our sense of free will.  This inference from unreflective intention to free will skepticism may seem intuitive at first. However, upon reflection, this argument seems to entail a magical view of free will. So, insofar as free will does not require magic, unreflective intentions do not necessarily undermine our sense of free will.


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Biografía del autor/a

Nick Byrd, Stevens Institute of Technology, NJ, USA

Stevens Institute of Technology, NJ, USA


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Cómo citar

Byrd, N. (2021). Pensándolo bien, las intenciones irreflexivas al estilo Libet pueden ser compatibles con el libre albedrío. Lógoi. Revista De Filosofía, (039), 17–28.