*Pensándolo bien, las intenciones irreflexivas al estilo Libet pueden ser compatibles con el libre albedrío\**

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**Resumen**

Algunos han argumentado que nuestro sentido de libre albedrío es una ilusión. Y algunos basan este escepticismo en lo que interpretan como el momento en que nos volvemos conscientes de nuestras intenciones. La evidencia sugiere que las intenciones no reflexivas se forman antes de que seamos conscientes de ellas. Y eso se supone que desafía nuestro sentido del libre albedrío. Esta inferencia puede parecer intuitiva al principio. Sin embargo, este argumento parece implicar una visión mágica del libre albedrío. En la medida en que este no requiere magia, las intenciones no reflexivas no necesariamente socavan nuestro sentido de libre albedrío

**Palabras clave**: Irracionalidad, pensamiento crítico, argumentación, retórica

*On Second Thought, Libet-style Unreflective Intentions May Be Compatible With Free Will\**

Abstract

Some have argued that our sense of free will is an illusion. And some base this free will skepticism on claims about when we become consciously aware of our intentions. Evidence suggests that unreflective intentions form before we are conscious of them. And that is supposed to challenge our sense of free will. This inference from unreflective intention to free will skepticism may seem intuitive at first. However, upon reflection, this argument seems to entail a magical view of free will. So, insofar as free will does not require magic, unreflective intentions do not necessarily undermine our sense of free will.

Keywords: reflection, intention, free will, neuroscience, philosophy of mind

*En y repensant, les intentions non réfléchies du style Libet peuvent être compatibles avec le libre arbitre\**

**Résumé**

Certains ont soutenu que notre sentiment de libre arbitre est une illusion. Et certains fondent ce scepticisme du libre arbitre sur ce qu’ils interprètent comme le moment où nous devenons conscients de nos intentions. Les preuves suggèrent que des intentions non réfléchies se forment avant que nous en soyons conscients. Et cela remet en question notre sens du libre arbitre. Cette inférence peut sembler intuitive au premier abord. Pourtant, cet argument semble impliquer une vision magique du libre arbitre. Dans la mesure où le libre arbitre n’exige pas de magie, les intentions non réfléchies ne sapent pas nécessairement notre sens de libre arbitre.

**Mots clés:** réflexion, intention, libre arbitre, neurosciences, philosophie de l’esprit

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“If the ‘act now’ process is initiated unconsciously, then conscious free will is not doing it.”

–Benjamin Libet (2001, p. 61)

Suppose you are scrolling through a feed of your favorite online content. You are not necessarily keeping track of time, but you are consciously and deliberately deciding what to look at, read, tap, and swipe. In other words, you are intentionally engaging with some contents of the feed and skipping other parts of the feed. Now suppose that you are doing this while neuroscientists are recording your brain activity. Eventually, the neuroscientists are familiar enough with your brain activity and behavior that they can predict your looking, tapping, and swiping before you are even aware of your intention to look, tap, or swipe. Would these predictions undermine your sense of free will?

Some have argued that our sense of free will is an illusion (e.g., Wegner, 2002). And some base this free will skepticism on claims about unreflective intentions that form before we are conscious of them. This inference from unreflective intention to free will skepticism may seem intuitive at first. If I am free to form my own intentions, then I should be conscious of them as soon as I form them. So, if I am conscious of my intentions only after they form, then I seem unable to form my own intentions. I found this kind of argument intuitively plausible at first. However, upon reflection, I think that this argument might entail a magical view of free will. Thus, if free will does not require magic, then unreflective intentions do not necessarily threaten free will.

1. **Evidence**

The opening thought experiment is the 21st-century version of real studies conducted by researchers like Benjamin Libet. In Libet-style studies, participants are instructed to do something with their hand—e.g., raise a finger, tap a button, flex their wrist, etc. They can do this whenever they want. While participants are deciding what and when to move their hand, they are watching a clock-like device so that they can remember the moment that they were aware of their intention to choose. Throughout the study, researchers are recording the activity of participants’ hands and brains. After a participant decides to do something with their hand, the researchers ask the participants to point to the location on the clock at which they became aware of their intention to do something with their hand. The researchers end up with data about the timing of brain activity, hand activity, and participants’ awareness of their intentions (Figure 1).

A close up of a map

Description automatically generated

Figure 1. “Benjamin Libet's experiment in which he asked each subject to choose a random moment to flick their wrist while he measured the associated activity in their brain” (Createaccount, 2011).

With these data, researchers have claimed that they can predict whether participants’ will move their hands before the participant remembered being aware of their intention. The trick is a particular pattern of brain activity that reliably precedes not only participants’ hand movement, but their awareness of an intention to move their hand (Figure 2). Many have found this a provocative result, perhaps because of provocative remarks from Libet himself. “We do not hold people responsible for actions performed unconsciously, without the possibility of conscious control. […] Why then should an act unconsciously developed …over which [we have] no conscious control be regarded as an act of free will?” (Libet, 1999, pp. 52–53).

Figure 2. Timeline of events prior to voluntary finger movement, in research by Libet et al. (1983).

Many studies like Libet’s have been conducted. And researchers often claim to be able to predict voluntary actions before people are consciously aware of their intention to act (Koenig-Robert & Pearson, 2019). Some take this evidence about the order of brain activity and intention awareness as grounds for thinking that our sense of conscious and free will is illusory: “the brain started first, followed by the experience of conscious will, and finally followed by action” (Wegner, 2002).

Of course, you may not be convinced. You may reject the scientists’ explications of ‘intention’ (e.g., Mele, 2003), provide an alternative explanation of the data (e.g., Levy & Bayne, 2004), or question the connection between Libet-like protocols and free will more generally (e.g., Saigle et al., 2018). However, suppose you grant the provocative result and its supposed implication: we are not aware of intentions until after intention formation has occurred in our brain. Does that undermine free will? In the past, I thought that it might. However, after more reflection, I am less convinced. In what remains, I will explain my change of mind.

2**. Unreflective Intentions**

One interpretation of Libet-style results is that people are not consciously aware of their intentions until after their intentions form. Following standard explications of reflective cognition as both deliberate and conscious (Byrd, Revisions Requested; Shea & Frith, 2016), this would mean that intention formation can be unreflective. It might even mean that intentions themselves can be unreflective. This may seem odd to some. As Elisabeth Pacherie tells us, “Many philosophers hold the view that if we do something intentionally, we must be aware of what we are doing. Therefore, they consider that it is of the essence of intentions to be conscious” (Pacherie, 2015, pp. 1-2). However, many other philosophers and cognitive scientists are untroubled by unreflective intentions. Consider just a handful of examples.

• “bad faith involves a conflict between reflective volition (will) and unreflective intention” (Barger, 1976, p. 5).

• “…an understanding of unreﬂective intentions. Just as one may unreﬂectively yet intentionally avoid sitting in a position that is uncomfortable (without ever reﬂecting on that uncomfortable position), so, too, one may unreﬂectively yet intentionally avoid an uncomfortable venture into reﬂection (without ever reﬂecting on the sources of that discomfort)” (Church, 1987, pp. 364-65).

• “The goal-directed behavior specified in an implementation intention is triggered without conscious intent once the critical situational context is encountered” (Gollwitzer, 1999)

• “If many proximal intentions produce actions without the intentions showing up in consciousness, this is not a terribly surprising result” (Mele, 2009, p. 34).

**3. Argument**

So how might the existence of unconscious intentions challenge some notions of free will? The idea seems to be that if the actual causes of intended behaviour are unreflective, then our intended behavior is not free (see Mele, 2013 for a longer discussion). The premises of this kind of unfree-because-unreflective argument can take a few forms. Consider one.

1. I am not consciously aware of my intentions as or before they form.

2. If I am not consciously aware of intentions as or before they form, then intentions occur unreflectively. (This follows from our definition of ‘reflective’).

3. If intentions occur unreflectively, then whatever actions result from the intentions are not free.

4. Therefore, my intentional actions are not free.

These premises may seem intuitively plausible, especially if you share the free will skeptic’s intuition about Libet-style cases of unreflective intention. However, consider some of the hitherto hidden features of the unfree-because-unreflective argument.

The free will skeptic’s implication: If I am unaware of intentions as or before they form, then whatever actions result from the intention are not free. (This follows from 2 and 3.)

The neuroscience assumption: Intentions can be identified by certain patterns of neural activity.

The temporal observation: The neural correlates of our intentions occur prior to our awareness of our intentions.

The temporal observation is central to the free will skepticism that is motivated by a lack of self-conscious awareness. If we are to reinvigorate free will from the unfree-because-unreflective argument, then this may be the premise to attack. However, I will not dispute the temporal observation. By the end of this paper, it should be clear that free will may be unscathed by the temporal observation.

We might also be suspicious of the neuroscience assumption. For example, we may find ourselves wanting to know precisely why it is intention (as opposed to some other phenomena) that neuroscientists are monitoring during Libet-style studies. However, I cannot resolve that suspicion in the space remaining. Fortunately for the friend of free will, we may not satisfy this curiosity. So, I will grant the neuroscience assumption.

This leaves us with the free will skeptic’s implication. The point I want to make is that even if we grant the neuroscience assumption and the temporal observation, it is not clear why we should accept the free will skeptic’s implication. And if we reject the free will skeptic’s implication, then we may be able to reject the unfree-because-unreflective argument. After all, the free will skeptic’s implication is a direct consequence of two premises in the unfree-because-unreflective argument.

**4. Reframe & Reflection**

Consider the third-personal frame of the Libet-style study: a researcher can detect our intention before we do. Third-personal prediction of our behavior may be crucial to the intuition that we lack free will (Fischborn, 2016)—especially if this prediction comes from neuroscientists (Nahmias et al., 2007). But how might our intuition change if we reframe Libet-style studies to focus on our own perspective? Rather than ask when a researcher should be able to detect our intention, we can ask when we should be able to detect our intention. Should we be aware of our intention before it forms? As soon as it forms? Later?

When I reframe the Libet-style studies first-personally, I find that my initial free will skeptic intuition flips. I become much less concerned about the fact that I may be aware of my intentions only after they form. In case it is not entirely clear why the new frame results in a new intuition, allow me to explain.

**4.1 New Frame**

We agree that our mental activity corresponds to brain activity—to deny that would be to deny the motivation for cognitive science altogether. So, when I form an intention, my brain does something, and when I become aware of my intention, my brain does another thing (Figure 3).

So, just as our intentions precede our awareness thereof, the brain activities corresponding to our intentions precede the brain activities corresponding to our awareness of the intention. This is only natural. The neural correlates of my intentions must precede my awareness of the intentions and, therefore, the neural correlates of that awareness. My awareness cannot precede its corresponding brain activity! To suggest otherwise would be to reject the correspondence between mental activity and brain activity that motivates studies like Libet’s.

**4.2 New Intuition**

After reframing the Libet-style studies in terms of my ability to detect my own intentions, my sense of free will no longer feels threatened. It seems utterly unsurprising that my awareness of my intentions occurs after my intention and its corresponding brain activity. Think about the causation involved in free action. Becoming aware of an intention must be causally downstream of—among other things—the existence of the intention. So intention-forming brain activity must occur before downstream awareness of intention. How could I have rationally expected otherwise?

So which intuition is better? My prior intuition or my new intuition? One unforgivable problem with my prior intuition is that it seemed to imply some sort of magical thinking. My prior intuition involved a notion of free will according to which I could become aware of my intention before it existed.

**5. Conclusion**

If my new intuition is right, then one or more premises of the unfree-because-unconscious argument are false, which reinvigorates the possibility that our intentional actions can be free even if the original intention is unreflective at first.

And this makes good sense. The unfolding of Libet-style cases is unsurprising from the first-person sense of free will. After all, when I intend to do something, become aware of this intention, and then do it, the conditions for many notions of free will seem to be satisfied (Dennett, 2015). So if we find that intentions form pre-reflectively, such observations may be entirely compatible with free will. Indeed, unreflective intentions have been a staple in philosophers’ notions of free choice and will both before and after the time of Libet’s studies.

• “[For Sartre], unreflective intention is the direct expression of original choice” (Barger, 1976, p. 5).

• “We can see …implicit licensing of the will in our unreflective intentions in that we can and do stop forming them whenever we become aware of or think there are features of our circumstances that may provide us with reasons against these intentions or stronger reason for other competing intentions” (Sanchez, 2011, p. 115).

In fact, it is this latter ability to cancel unreflective intentions that prevented Libet from rejecting free will. “The volitional process is …initiated unconsciously. But the conscious function could still …veto the act. Free will is therefore not excluded” (B. Libet, 1999, p. 47)

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