A favor de las obligaciones imposibles
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.62876/lr.vi039.5027Palabras clave:
obligación imposible, deber implica poder, guía de acción, deliberación, alternativasResumen
En este artículo ofrezco una defensa de la posibilidad de las obligaciones imposibles al ofrecer argumentos en contra de la idea según la cual estas obligaciones son un sinsentido, pues la función esencial de una obligación es la de ser una guía para la acción, y una obligación imposible no puede indicar ninguna acción a realizar. Pretendo mostrar cómo la idea de que las obligaciones han de ser guías de acción, en conjunto con la máxima “deber implica poder”, lleva a consecuencias indeseables, y luego ofrezco argumentos para defender que las obligaciones imposibles están en mejor posición que otras obligaciones para guiar cierto tipo de acciones
In this paper, I present a defense of impossible obligations against the argument according to which these types of obligations are pointless or nonsensical because they do not comply with the basic action guidance function of an obligation. I attempt to show that the action-guidance function of obligations, together with the ‘ought implies can’ maxim, lead to undesirable consequences, and this result casts doubt on the argument against impossible obligations. Also, I provide an argument attempting to defend that impossible obligations are in a better position to guide certain actions than traditional obligations.
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Derechos de autor 2022 Carlos Patarroyo
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