Consideraciones para una revisión de la tributación petrolera venezolana
Resumen
Recientemente se celebró en el Banco Central de Venezuela un foro para revisar alternativas al actual marco tributario del sector petrolero venezolano. El presente trabajo hace una revisión de la literatura existente sobre las distintas consideraciones que hay que tener para dicha revisión. Primero comienza estudiando el problema en sí que enfrenta el productor de petróleo. De allí concluimos que la actual estructura presenta importantes distorsiones. Luego se analiza el problema que origina el hecho del tamaño relativo del sector petrolero en Venezuel. Usando un modelo y viendo la experiencia en otros países, encontramos que el sector petrolero( y por lo tanto el diseño de los impuestos al mismo) tiene un impacto en la forma como el shock de los precios del petróleo se transmite al tipo de cambio real. Esto puede tener consecuencias negativas en términos de crecimiento.Descargas
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