Puntos centrales del debate contemporáneo, los aportes más destacados para iniciar la discusión sobre gobierno corporativo
Palabras clave:
Gobierno Corporativo, Prácticas de Buen Gobierno, Corporate Governance, Good Government PracticesResumen
Este trabajo se propone cubrir un vacío en la discusión en el marco de las relaciones industriales acerca de los principales puntos a debatir en cuanto al ejercicio, definición y mecanismos actuales acerca del gobierno corporativo. Se mencionan las principales tendencias, mecanismos y procesos asociados al gobierno corporativo sin entrar en su discusión teórica y/o metodológica, esperando con ello aportar en un marco histórico y conceptual orientaciones acerca de las principales tendencias y líneas de investigación para futuros análisis a profundidad acerca del gobierno corporativo.
This paper intends to fill a gap in the industrial relations´s discussion about the main points to debate in the exercise, definition and mechanisms on corporate governance. It is mentioned the principal trends, mechanisms and processes related to corporate governance without going into theoretical and/or methodological discussion, hoping thereby, to provide a historical and conceptual orientations of the major trends and research areas for future in-depth analysis about the corporate governance.
Citas
Alchian, Armen A. y Harold Demzets (1972). Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization. EUA: American Economic Review, 62 (5), 777-795.
Allen, Franklin y Gale, Douglas (2000). Optimal Currency Crises. Pennsylvania: Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-23, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
Benavides Franco, Julián (S/F). Historia del Gobierno Corporativo en el mundo: Definción, y objetivos del GobiernoCorporativo. Colombia En: Libro Blanco de Gobierno Corporativo, Confecamaras.
Berle, Adolf A y Means, Gardiner C. (1991) The Modern Corporation and Private Property. EUA:Transaction Publishers.
Bhagat, Sanjai y Black, Bernard S. (2002). The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance: EUA: University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Finance Northwestern University - School of Law; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) As published in Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 27, Pp. 231-273.
Boot, A., Gopalan, r. y Thakor, A. (2006). Market Liquidity, Investor Participation and Managerial Autonomy: Why Do Firms Go Private? London: CEPRDiscussion Paper N°. 5510, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Border, KC. (2002). Brief Notes on the Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie Model of an Economy. EUA:California Institute of Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences Technology En: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~kcb/Notes/Arrow-Debreu.pdf (junio, 2011).
Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship (2005). The Value Proposition for Corporate Citizenship. London: Autor.
Brenne, Robert (2002). The Boom and the Bubble: The US in the World Economy. California:Verso.
Bruno, Valentina Stijn, G. (2007). Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing? EUA: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4140.
Cadbury, Adrian (2002). Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal View, EUA: Oxford: Oxford University Press
Chhaochharia,Vidhi y Laeven, L. (2007). The Invisible Hand in Corporate Governance. EUA: ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance Working Paper N° 165.
Crespo Figueras, Héctor (2005). Las claves para que una empresa mejore su relación con la sociedad Argentina 26/05/2005 - El Cronista. Pág.13/Sección: Opinión
Definition Working Group Ethics Resource Center (2008). Leading Corporate Integrity: Defining the Role of the Chief Ethics & Compliance Officer(CECO). En: http://www.compliancebuilding.com/2008/11/20/leading-corporate-integrity-defining-the-role-of-the-chief-ethics-and-compliance-officer/ (junio, 2011).
Díaz Ortega, Enrique (S/F). Gobierno Corporativo: lo que todo empresario debe saber. Programa Kemmerer -- de desarrollo e integración de los mercados financieros. México:Corporación Andina de Fomento. Documento elaborado por el Centro de Estudios de Mercados de Capitales y Financiero.
Djordjija Petkoski y C. Lee Essrig (2002). Business Ethics and Corporate Accountability: The Search for Standard. EUA: WBI series on corporate responsibility, accountability, and sustainable competitiveness Ethics / World Bank Institute and the Ethics Officer Association. En:http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/57523/bizethics_ econference.pdf (junio, 2011).
Dvorak, Phred y Podolsky, Sam (2005). Arte ó Ciencia en el Gobierno Corporativo. Seminario Internacional de Gobernabilidad. Bogotá, Colombia – Centro Nacional de Gobierno Corporativo.
Fama, E. F., Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. EUA: Journal of Law and Economics 26, 301-325.
Googins, Bradley K. y Mirvis, Philip (2006). Stages of Corporate Citizenship: A Developmental Framework. EUA: California Management Review. Vol. 48, N° 2.
Googins, K. (2007). Time for Advocacy. EUA: The Wall Street Journal On-line. Career Journal.
Grossman, Sanford y Hart, Oliver (1986). The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. EUA: Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), pp. 691–719.
Grupo especial de trabajo sobre buen gobierno (2006). Proyecto de código unificado de recomendaciones sobre buen gobierno de las sociedades cotizadas. Madrid, España.
Hart, Oliver (1983). Imperfect Competition in General Equilibrium: An Overview of Recent Work . EUA: Frontiers of Economics, edited by K. Arrow and S. Honkapohja, / Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Hirsch, Julia y Walz, Uwe (2006). Why Do Contracts Differ between VC Types? Market Segmentation versus Corporate Governance Varieties. EUA: CFS Working Paper, No. 12
Huang, Kevin X.D y Werner, Jan (2000). Asset price bubbles in Arrow-Debreu and sequential equilibrium. EUA:Economic Theory Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 253-278.
International Corporate Governance Network (2007). International Corporate Governance Network 12th Annual Conference Corporate Governance –Seizing the Initiative Investment Decision-Making: How do we Mainstream Corporate Governance Summary of the Proceedings in the Breakout. Cape Town: Autor: Session 4- 6.
Jensen, Michael C. y Meckling, William (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. EUA: Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-60.
Kester, C. (1997). Governance, contracting and investmente horizons: a look at Japan and Germany, Oxford University Press.
López Guzmán, Marco Francisco y Barber Kuri, Carlos Miguel (S/F). ABC del Gobierno Corporativo. En: http://www.esmas.com/emprendedores/pymesint/gobiernocorporativo /491539.html# (diciembre, 2010).
Lopez-deSilanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei y Vishny, robert W. (1999). Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation. NBEr Working Paper No. 7428. En: http://www.nber.org/papers/w7403.pdf (diciembre, 2010)
Macey, Jonathan r. Y Boot, Arnoud W. A. Boot (2004). Monitoring Corporate Performance: The role of Objectivity, Proximity and Adaptability in Corporate Governance. Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1420. http://digitalcommons.law.yale. edu/fss_papers/1420 (junio, 2011)
Mayer, Thierry, Crozet, Matthieu y Mucchielli, Jean-Louis (2003). How do Firms Agglomerate? A Study of FDI in France CEPr Discussion Papers 3873, C.E.P.R.
Murphy, Joe (2007). Compliance & Ethics: How can the CEO make the difference? En: ww.corporatecompliance.org
O’Donovan, Gabrielle (2005). Corporate Culture Re-Defined for the 21st Century.EUA:
The International Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Change Management, Volume 6, Issue 8, pp.215-230.
Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo (2004). White Paper sobre Gobierno Corporativo en América Latina. Mexico: Autor. Traducido de la versión original en inglés
publicada con el título: OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.
Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales (1998). The Tyranny of Inequality. EUA: Financial Dependence and Growth. American Economic Review, LXXXVIII, 559-586.
Scharfstein, David S y Stein, Jeremy C. (1990). Herd Behavior and Investment. EUA: American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 465-79, June.
Shleifer, Andrei y Vishny, robert (1986). Large Shareholders and Corporate Control.EUA: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 3, pp. 461-488.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny (1997). Stock Market Driven Acquisitions. EUA:Journal of Financial Economics.
The Global Corporate Governance Forum (2009). Corporate Governance: better companies better societies. Autor En: http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/cgf.nsf/ AttachmentsByTitle/LessonsLearnedFeb09/$FILE/Lessons+Learned+Feb+09.pdf (junio, 2011).
Zetzsche, Dirk A. (2007). An Ethical Theory of Corporate Governance History. Germany: Heinrich-Heine-University Duesseldorf / Faculty of Law - Center for Business and Corporate Law research Paper Series (CBC-rPS).
