*La apertura de Landgrebe a la fenomenología.*

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**Resumen**

La apertura hacia el mundo y la experiencia reflexiva individual son pilares fundamentales en los enfoques fenomenológicos de Landgrebe, Fink y Patočka. En el caso especial de Landgrebe y su fenomenología constructiva, este busca abordar los problemas de la metafísica a través de la clarificación de significados mediante la interpretación fenomenológica de cuestiones del idealismo. Para Landgrebe, el conocimiento estricto coincide con el absoluto, el cual surge a partir de las posibilidades de significado o sentido. La recuperación de la metafísica, innata en el ser humano, requiere evaluar el origen metafísico del nacimiento del hombre. De esta manera, Landgrebe propone iniciar el camino fenomenológico buscando el camino hacia lo absoluto en lo profundo de la subjetividad. Este camino nos lleva a enfrentar la intersubjetividad del mundo como objetiva y la primacía del "tú" frente al "yo". La fenomenología metafísica original de Landgrebe busca superar el dualismo entre conciencia y ser, y entre conocimiento y creencia. El análisis de la estructura intencional del horizonte revela un concepto absolutista que va más allá del hombre y su conocimiento, representando a la vez la base y el vínculo entre ambos. El movimiento se convierte en la conexión única y originaria entre sujeto y mundo.

**Palabras clave**: Fenomenología, Hermenéutica, Metafísica, Ludwig Landgrebe, Eugen Fink, Jan Patočka, Mundo de la vida, Método del hilo conductor, Ontología, Experiencia.

*Landgrebe’s Opening of Phenomenology*

Abstract

Opening up to the world and individual reflective experience are fundamental pillars in the phenomenological approaches of Landgrebe, Fink, and Patočka. In the special case of Landgrebe and his constructive phenomenology, he seeks to address the problems of metaphysics through the clarification of meanings through the phenomenological interpretation of questions of idealism. For Landgrebe, strict knowledge coincides with the absolute, which arises from the possibilities of meaning or sense. The recovery of metaphysics, innate in the human being, requires evaluating the metaphysical origin of the birth of man. In this way, Landgrebe proposes to initiate the phenomenological path by seeking the path to the absolute in the depths of subjectivity. This path leads us to face the intersubjectivity of the world as objective and the primacy of the "you" over the "I". Landgrebe's original metaphysical phenomenology seeks to overcome the dualism between consciousness and being, and between knowledge and belief. The analysis of the intentional structure of the horizon reveals an absolutist concept that goes beyond man and his knowledge, representing both the basis and the link between them. Movement becomes the unique and original connection between subject and world.

Key Words: Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, Metaphysics, Ludwig Landgrebe, Eugen Fink, Jan Patočka, Life World, Central Thread’s Method, Ontology, Experience.

*L'ouverture de Landgrebe à la phénoménologie.*

**Résumé**

L'ouverture au monde et l'expérience réflexive individuelle sont des piliers fondamentaux dans les approches phénoménologiques de Landgrebe, Fink et Patočka. Dans le cas particulier de Landgrebe et de sa phénoménologie constructive, il cherche à aborder les problèmes de la métaphysique par la clarification des significations grâce à l'interprétation phénoménologique des questions de l'idéalisme. Pour Landgrebe, la connaissance stricte coïncide avec l'absolu, qui découle des possibilités de signification ou de sens. La récupération de la métaphysique, innée dans l'être humain, exige d'évaluer l'origine métaphysique de la naissance de l'homme. Landgrebe propose ainsi d'initier le chemin phénoménologique en cherchant le chemin de l'absolu dans les profondeurs de la subjectivité. Ce chemin nous conduit à affronter l'intersubjectivité du monde en tant qu'objectif et la primauté du « tu » sur le « je ». La phénoménologie métaphysique originale de Landgrebe cherche à dépasser le dualisme entre la conscience et l'être, et entre la connaissance et la croyance. L'analyse de la structure intentionnelle de l'horizon révèle un concept absolutiste qui dépasse l'homme et son savoir, représentant à la fois la base et le lien entre eux. Le mouvement devient le lien unique et original entre le sujet et le monde.

**Mots clés :** Phénoménologie, herméneutique, métaphysique, Ludwig Landgrebe, Eugen Fink, Jan Patočka, monde de la vie, méthode du fil central, ontologie, expérience.

***A abertura da fenomenologia por Landgrebe.***

**Resumo:**

A abertura ao mundo e a experiência reflexiva individual são pilares fundamentais nas abordagens fenomenológicas de Landgrebe, Fink e Patočka. No caso especial de Landgrebe e da sua fenomenologia construtiva, ele procura abordar os problemas da metafísica através da clarificação dos significados através da interpretação fenomenológica das questões do idealismo. Para Landgrebe, o conhecimento rigoroso coincide com o absoluto, que surge das possibilidades de significado ou sentido. A recuperação da metafísica, inata no ser humano, requer a avaliação da origem metafísica do nascimento do homem. Desta forma, Landgrebe propõe iniciar o percurso fenomenológico procurando o caminho para o absoluto nas profundezas da subjetividade. Este caminho leva-nos a enfrentar a intersubjetividade do mundo como objetivo e o primado do “tu” sobre o “eu”. A fenomenologia metafísica original de Landgrebe procura superar o dualismo entre consciência e ser, e entre conhecimento e crença. A análise da estrutura intencional do horizonte revela um conceito absolutista que ultrapassa o homem e o seu conhecimento, representando simultaneamente a base e a ligação entre eles. O movimento torna-se a ligação única e original entre o sujeito e o mundo.

**Palavras-chave:** Fenomenologia, Hermenêutica, Metafísica, Ludwig Landgrebe, Eugen Fink, Jan Patočka, Mundo da Vida, Método do Fio Central, Ontologia, Experiência.

Throughout his career Ludwig Landgrebe believed that there is much to learn from the analysis of human consciousness through the lens of phenomenological perspective. The self-development of Absolute [*Selbstentfaltung des Absoluten*] describes a man’s development: each moment as an active state of being aware, a clear and conscious living, if so, the world’s sense of history can’t be conceived as progress itself, unless you to pay attention to every single moment of its existence. This is what Landgrebe defines as the movement of time: «Jeder bewusste Blick des Genies ist die Sinnerfüllung des Universums und die Überwindung seiner Endlichkeit und Vergänglichkeit, weil diese dadurch unwesentlich geworden ist.»[[1]](#footnote-1) The focus is on the living experience [*Erleben*] and only by beginning with the finite resource of the living experience can we hope to delve into and discover the absolute:

Was erlebt wurde, hat seine Ewigkeit in sich und ist Sinnerfüllung, gleichgültig, was danach kommen mag. Hierin ist nicht mehr von einem Fortschritt und einer Steigerung. Jede grosse Minute menschlichen Wachseins ist ein letzter Gipfel in sich. Das Absolute hat viele, unzählich viele solche Gipfel und das “nicht mehr“ und das “noch nicht” sind nur ganz unwesentliche Bestimmungen.[[2]](#footnote-2)

From a phenomenological and hermeneutical point of view, what disappoints Landgrebe is the superficiality in which his contemporaries utilize the word ‘*Lebenswelt’*,without completely understanding all the key components to this concept. To Ludwig Landgrebe, the phenomenological question focuses on the relationship between world and man, which is the *trait d’union* between Landgrebe, Fink and Patočka. As I have shown in previous writings *Wege zu einer neuen Phänomenologie: Landgrebe, Fink und Patočka im Dialog*[[3]](#footnote-3). Landgrebe identified and analyzed the aporias of the concept of “thing” in order to thoroughly investigate this relationship between world and man.

Landgrebe’s original method [*Leitfadenmethod*] is also the instrument he uses to remember what has been forgotten. In this way, Landgrebe traces a path-route-itinerary in order to obtain the conditions of experience. Therefore, every moment of a man’s development becomes clear, which he refers to as a state of “been aware”. The movement of time is particularly important in this process as to understand every detail of every instant. Through this process the conscience being coincides with itself. In the 1970’s, Landgrebe attempted to find a way to conceive the Husserl’s program as an ontology of the life world [*Ontologie der Lebenswelt*]. A concept in which the transcendental and phenomenological reflection, work in unison. Furthermore Landgrebe divided and identified four thematic dimensions within his theory of ontology of the life world: genetic phenomenology, hermeneutic, dialectic and history.

Ludwig Landgrebe’s crucial text that formed the basis of his ideas is the study he wrote between 1929 and 1932, entitled *Der Begriff des Erlebens. Ein Beitrag zur Kritik unseres Selbstverständnisses und zum Problem der seelischen Ganzheit*. This study is a dense phenomenological elaboration on the concept of living [*Erleben*], carried out through an original and stringent methodology, i.e. the central thread’s method [*Leitfadenmethode*] which is able to shed light on the concept of self-comprehension and the human spirit. Within the Introduction of this volume - *Das Problem des Erlebens als Problem unseres Selbstverständnisses. Sinn und Methode der Untersuchung* – Landgrebe emphasizes his research’s methodology. Landgrebe proceeds by researching the central thread’s method and isolating the concept of the living [*Erlebnis*]. He used this concept as a keystone of a man’s self-comprehension in combination with his crucial concept of the life world. These central themes reflect the original and acting field of a man’s self-comprehension [*Selbstverständnis*].

The difficulty with applying Landgrebe’s novel method can be found in the fact that understanding the central thread’s efficacy was on the list of objectives as well as the research goals themselves: the concept of living must be researched and this will continue in another field in which we question the living. This is a man’s self-comprehension which connects phenomenologically to intentionality. Landgrebe’s method is ‘phenomenological praxis’ which focuses on the relevance of the concepts to us and for us, rather than on their extrinsic definition. Through the method of phenomenological bracketing [*Einklammerung*] (a radical process), Landgrebe isolates the concept of intentionality and questions it:

Es ist damit zugleich die Aufgabe gestellt, den Begriff des Bewusstseins selbst zum Thema zu machen und danach zu fragen, welchen Sinn und welches Recht es hat, nach den einzelnen Bestimmungen unseres Seins als nach Phänomenen des Bewusstseins zu fragen. Sind diese Einheiten der Intentionalität, als Einheiten des intentionalen Gerichtetseins auf Gegenständliches, charakterisiert, so wird damit zugleich der Begriff der Intentionalität zum Problem[[4]](#footnote-4).

In Landgrebe’s words, the interpretation of our natural self-consciousness when using the central thread method to answer question of the living, presents the form of a man’s ontology, an ‘a-priori anthropology’. In order to understand our essence as a whole being, it is necessary to put in brackets the prejudices which outline a man as a being between other beings. For this purpose, Landgrebe actuates a “transition of reductions”:

Damit erfolgt der Übergang von der „psychologisch-phänomenologischen” Reduktion, die uns selbst als ein Seiendes in der Welt bestehen und uns den Begriff von der Ganzheit unser selbst als Kategorie einer Region von weltlich Seiendem gewinnen lässt, zur *transzendentalen Reduktion*[[5]](#footnote-5).

By way of transcendental reduction, a man conceives himself not as a being between other beings, but as that subjectivity in which its own self-comprehension is the origin of all comprehensions of the being and the regions of the being. The question of a man’s origin, in essence, can’t be released from the world’s origin. Through the transcendental approach an inversion of the aprioristic-phenomenological question occurs: not from world to man – but from man to world. In order to convey this fundamental transition, Landgrebe refers to another time with the intention to find – or rediscover – the central themes of the ontological-mundane field. At first, Landgrebe proceeds by removing the naivety of a man’s belief system from all instances of his encounters with other living beings [*Erlebnis*] throughout his lifetime. Utilizing this phenomenological process, the acts of living will be isolated and analyzed in a genetic-descriptive manner, void of any psychological analysis. The being’s consciousness [*Sein bei Bewußtsein*] is what Landgrebe describes as the premise of experience. He refers to the modality of *being-aware* [*Wach-Sein*], a pure state of being awake - i.e. wakefulness – instead as a modality of our being: «*Unser Wach-Sein ist also ein Sein in der Weise des „ich bin“.*»[[6]](#footnote-6) Our being-direct to something in our action, with our being here, defines the first concept of *active intentionality* in Landgrebe: «Unser Wach-Sein hat ständig in sich eine aktive Intentionalität in dem Sinne, dass wir ständig in ihm tuend bei etwas dabei, von uns aus darauf gerichtet sind.»[[7]](#footnote-7)

From this point of view, Landgrebe’s dissertation retreads a lot of the same paths of thought as Husserl, who refers to the first type of intentionality, namely the active one, as of *being direct-to*. Later, Husserl will distinguish this type of intentionality from another passive one, moving away from Brentano’s theory which considers the entire consciousness as intentional. His basis being that every second of being conscious of something, includes itself as the object of reference. Being present in acting is characterized as a *being-direct-to-something* which could be fundamental or secondary. Therefore, it is divided into two intentional modalities: one actual and one potential. Potential here refers thoughts that are not yet the object of our attention. All of our desires are possibilities of our being which characterizes itself as *Seinkonnen*: this attribute of possibility produces the effectiveness of determination [*Wirklichkeit dieser Bestimmungen*].

Inside the Landgrebe’s phenomenological architecture, the importance of the “to-something” [*Zu-Etwas*]is clear. This characterizes the structure of our *be-conscious* as *can-be*. The attitude of the subject to his own determinations must configure itself as a possibility in the feeling of inclination to-something: he doesn’t possess them, he only relates to them. The living, intended in an existential sense, can’t be based on a routine. Only intended in this way, the *concretion of act* and his internal structure is what makes the subject an I-agent, i.e. the subject’s attitude and decisions about his own being, it is possible to question his herald, namely his own “self”. In this articulated architecture, Landgrebe finds a difficulty in identifying emotional dispositions [*Stimmungen*]: differently from acting, dispositions come to the subject, but they aren’t simple inclinations of a determination of it, but possibilities of its being, a new way to approach something.

In his methodological proceeding, Landgrebe stresses the fact that phenomenology advances in a sporadic manner throughout the central thread’s method. He expressed his particular views within the paragraph’s titles (e.g.: *§ 25. Die Frage nach dem Charakter des Zusammenhangs der Stimmungen. a) Vordeutung auf die durch diese Frage geforderte Wendung der Untersuchung[[8]](#footnote-8)*). The phenomenological research proposed by Landgrebe built upon the concept of isolating a specific theme; analyzing it theoretically at first in its own natural state and then relating it with the whole experience. This research invokes a shift to a more overt subject matter than only focusing on peculiar emotional states. In the case of dispositions, it is a sporadic process which presents itself as flash-backs of the past while simultaneously adding elements and modifying the contents, changing the memory as a whole. However, at the end they each contribute to form a picture closer to our way of being or our way of acting. The concept of the world which comes to the Landgrebe’s dissertation in this text, is an interpretative product of our natural self-comprehension [*in-der-Welt-sein*]. Landgrebe then proposes to investigate the concept of the natural world which binds the phenomenological projects of Landgrebe, Fink and Patočka. Our being is indeed conceivable only inside the continuous horizon’s structure of the only one world but at this point, Landgrebe questions the word’s unity, and he wants to discover the apriori structure which doesn’t coincide with the unity of the I-consciousness [*Ichbewusstseins*]. This research begins with the 32nd paragraph of his text entitled *Der Sinn der Problematik des „natürlichen Weltbegriffs” und die Aufgabe seiner Auslegung* – which encompasses many similarities with the ideas developed by Patočka, precisely within the context of a phenomenology. There are two levels of research that Landgrebe addresses in the following four paragraphs of the third chapter: the first is to elaborate on his comprehension of the world’s fundamental structure and the second is to refer to the ways of our being as being-in-the-world. The core finding of this research is that the unlimited development of experience does not contradict every single subject enclosed in the limits of his surrounding world but represents a possibility for them. Throughout the compounding effects of each experience in the world, it forever remains something strange and incomprehensible. It is precisely this fact that allows for the horizon’s opening [*Offenheit des Horizontes*].

The second part of the study – titled *Die Auslegung unseres Selbstverständnisses als Problem der Intentionalität* – Landgrebe discusses genetic-phenomenological contribution which provides to the living concept.[[9]](#footnote-9) The Landgrebe’s analysis reaches a crucial turning point with the notion of “associative awakening”. It indicates a structure of the horizon’s construction. The development of the inclination’s question discloses that this fact coincides with the question of the construction of the same horizon. It remains to investigate, then, the structures [*Erwartungen*] which make the world an horizon: «Diese „Erwartungen“ sind nichts anderes als die *Struktur des Offenstehens selbst*; sie sind geweckt durch das *assoziative „Erinnern-an…“* und dieses ist daher *primär eine assoziative Weckung von Erwartungen*»[[10]](#footnote-10). There is a continuous recall between activity and passivity of being-conscious: the two conditions are not opposed, but they are in a dialectic relationship which creates the unity. The horizon’s opening is a passive self-construction. The passivity indicates not only the simple and unanalyzed instance of the horizon’s open-remaining but is also the internal concept of the structures that constitute the horizon’s opening. As Landgrebe writes:

Nur auf Grund eines solchen Behaltens, eines Behaltens alles Erfahrenen als typischer Vorzeichnung für künftige Erfahrungen, ist überhaupt assoziative Weckung als Öffnung des Horizontes für den weiteren Fortgang unserer Erfahrungen, unseres tuenden Dabeiseins möglich[[11]](#footnote-11).

The *typische Vorzeichnung für weitere Erfahrungen* is the ability of the pure passivity that constitutes the action’s horizon and, on this basis, the self-consciousness is conceived as an experience of what is experienced during the experience itself. The intentionality’s unity is constructed by the active and passive genesis. At this point, Landgrebe questions a crucial theme: «Inwiefern ist aber die Passivität als horizontbildende selbst eine Genesis?»[[12]](#footnote-12) The concept of keep [*Behalten*] is enlightening at this junction, it is in fact perceivable only if it is present as an active or passive genesis which grows [*Werden*]. Additionally, ‘keeping’ isn’t closed, but it is a structure’s description, and the structure is open. An example of this is presented by the two states of being awake and sleeping. This concept questions Landgrebe, are we in the world while we sleep? We are in the world within the modality in which in every single moment we could be wakened, and – on the other side – it is only in the wake that it is possible to understand what the sleep is: «Selbstverständlich können wir, was Schlafen ist, nur im Wachsein auslegen, weil im Schlaf ein Auslegen als unser Tun nicht möglich ist»[[13]](#footnote-13). The philosopher then traces a parallel between dreaming and the pure passivity of the associative “remember of”, our dreams are “our” like something remembered. There’s a necessary connection between what is dreamed as a condition of experience and the free fantasy. The subject of being, infact, can only be a being in the world: «Darin liegt, dass *auch das Geträumte an die Bedingungen der Erfahrbarkeit gebunden* ist, ebenso wie die noch so freie Phantasie. Es ist daran gebunden in der Weise, dass wir als Seiende nicht anders sein können als in einer Welt seiend»[[14]](#footnote-14). The possibility of dreaming indicates that while sleeping, the world’s horizon is closed. But its effectiveness is not lost:

Die Möglichkeit des Träumens deutet darauf, was es heißt, dass im Schlafen die Horizonte unserer Welt zwar geschlossen sind, aber doch ihre Affektivität nicht verloren gegangen ist, darauf, *wie eine Affizierbarkeit bei geschlossenen Horizonten überhaupt verstanden werden kann*.[[15]](#footnote-15)

Sleeping is therefore a passive wait: «Insofern ist Schlafen ein Affizierbarbleiben, es ist Kontinuität des passiven Erwartens, der „jederzeitigen“ Bereitschaft, sich wieder in die sich öffnenden Horizonte hineinzurichten»[[16]](#footnote-16). In Landgrebe’s thought, therefore, it is possible to speak of a passive genesis: «Es ist also *erwiesen, dass die Passivität selber eine Genesis ist*, dass die Rede von einer passiven Genesis, auf deren Grund die aktive, das Weiterschreiten unserer Erfahrung im tuenden Dabeisein geschieht, ihr Recht hat»[[17]](#footnote-17).

By analyzing the states of dreaming and sleeping, and how it relates to wakefulness and memory, it is possible to see how the use of the peculiar central thread’s method works to help determine and comprehend the conflicts or conceptual aporias which seem unsolvable at first sight. By utilizing demonstrations – through a hermeneutic path – the intrinsic genesis of passivity emerges inside of the experience’s activity. All that is given to us in the world must have a meaning, even if in the modality of incomprehensible, to be effectively given. The core of Landgrebe’s phenomenology is recognized precisely in the universal sense of being:

*Sinn* in dieser universalen Bedeutung ist *nicht trennbar von Sein*. Es kann kein Seiendes für uns geben, das schlechthin sinnlos wäre, da diese Bedeutung von Sinn nichts anderes in sich schließt als den Inbegriff der Strukturen, die überhaupt Seiendes für uns <als> solches sein lassen, Erfahrbares überhaupt, Explikables, solches, das uns in unserer Welt begegnen kann.[[18]](#footnote-18)

To Landgrebe, the question of truth reduces itself to the question of the relation between ourselves and our senses’ construction of our active experiences [*Erfahrungsbesitz*]. For example, the entire world or the subject of experiencer or experienced. The experienced property becomes a judgement’s property, at this regard Landgrebe specifies what it has to be intended as a property [*Besitz*], i.e. only the horizons possess that which enables other experiences. Our world is not solipsistic, but is the one that we share with each other and in which we live together. The canned world in which we grow up – that includes comprehensibility and understandability – has its limits, but the properly ontological constant of *being-in-the-world* is exactly our being as directed by our actions. Landgrebe’s research accomplishes the pure reduction of what is intended: «Es ist also eine *Reduktion rein auf das „Vermeinte als solches*”, eine Reduktion, die *noch nicht die transzendentale,* sondern sozusagen eine *psychologisch-phänomenologische* ist.»[[19]](#footnote-19) The typical character of being is different from nature and the entrance modality of this character in our action, therefore the whole process of becoming is important. It must be remembered that a certain living, as well as a certain action, is only a character between others and what must be found is the *Zusammenhangscharaktere der Lebensbedeutung*. It is important to understand the whole character, not as a product of the sense’s construction but as an *Index* to understand the absolute. It permits them to consider the character as a trace [*Verweisung*] of the living’s whole, enclosed in that of the single.

The universal concept of becoming that emerges from Landgrebe’s thought is shared by Fink and Patočka: the whole becoming is universal in the way in which every individual is as a whole enclosed within itself. The process of becoming is fundamental to Landgrebe, in the way in which permits the same experience as a continuous process. Therefore, it does not find concert with a meaning of becoming, one which we can define as *static-reflective*.

Since Landgrebe’s introduction of phenomenology the field of research now seems boundless, the coordinates was obtained by the philosopher through a pragmatic act, practicing the phenomenological exercise, as Husserl recommended. In this sense, Landgrebe defines his endeavor as a *biographic reflection*:

Es ist sozusagen eine *biographische Reflexion*, der alle diese Reden von Erleben Ausdruck geben, und ihr Ziel ist, das Leben des jeweils Einzelnen als eine aus freiem Können so und so gestaltete Ganzheit zu charakterisieren, als eine Ganzheit für den Beschauer in ein *Bild*  zu bringen.[[20]](#footnote-20)

Since the analysis of the living concept was revealed, a once complex labyrinth now has the possibility to be navigated thanks to the *central threads*.

Landgrebe’s analysis referred to in this paper is very important to understand the phenomenological route traced by the philosopher, alongside his differences from the Husserl’s project. First of all, it is his method which seeks to undertake a more hermeneutical[[21]](#footnote-21) and wide phenomenological itinerary.

The concept of opening is the constant theme throughout the different phenomenological routes that Landgrebe, Fink and Patočka project. The phenomenological experience is provided by the individual’s reflective experience of the living world. This horizon is shared by Landgrebe – and also by Fink and Patočka: their deductions are openings to the world, enabled from their experiences. His peculiar definition of the world is shared by Fink and Patočka: «Welt ist der Horizont, innerhalb dessen wir uns in unserem Tun bewegen: Das besagt daher, sie ist überhaupt nur Welt für uns, weil sie Bezug hat auf das, was wir sein können und sein werden»[[22]](#footnote-22). The becoming’s movement inside the world was crucial from them: each individual is in fact, a universe enclosed within itself, therefore it is crucial that the experience perceived is as a continuous process in building universal knowledge.

The aim of the Landgrebe’s constructive phenomenology is to face and solve the problems of metaphysics, his phenomenological route consists of a meaning’s clarification through the phenomenological interpretation of Idealism issues. In this sense, it could be affirmed by Landgrebe, that strict knowledge coincides with the absolute, one which – as it has been shown – proceeds in the manner of possibilities of meaning or sense. The only way to recover metaphysics, which is innate in man, is to assess the metaphysical origin of a man’s birth. Landgrebe suggests that in order to start down the phenomenological path, it must first be searched the way which conduces to the absolute in the deep of subjectivity. Going down this path, we face the world’s intersubjectivity as objective and the primacy of “you” compared to “I”. Through the original metaphysical phenomenology presented by Landgrebe, there will be no dualism between the concepts of consciousness and being; or between knowledge and belief, because the analysis of the horizon’s intentional structure returns an absolutists’ concept which overcomes a man and his knowledge and – at the same time – represents the basis and the bond. The movement returns as the only and originating connection between subject and world. Fink and Patočka who recognize this in the same manner as Landgrebe discuss the importance of experience: our thought’s operations come from the world, immediately lived, of our experience. The phenomenological experience is given by the reflective experience of living the world. In this regard, the phenomenological reduction is an opening enabled by experience and it is an act of full freedom.

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5. L. Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. L. Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens,* 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. L. Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. L. Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens,* 85. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. As specified in the *Nachwort* of the edition by Karel Novotný and Hans Reiner Sepp: «Die Analyse ist in zwei Hauptabschnitte unterteilt: Im ersten Abschnitt (§§ 12-37) soll ein statisch-phänomenologisches Vorgehen die Einzelstrukturen auf ein Ganzes beziehen, dessen Struktur das In-der-Welt-sein ausmacht, wie Landgrebe unter Entlehnung des Heideggerschen Begriffs formuliert; der zweite Abschnitt will in einer genetisch-phänomenologischen Vertiefung des Begriffs des Ganzen den Ursprung der einzelnen Strukturen aus diesem Ganzen nachweisen». L. Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 211. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. L. Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 132. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. L. Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. L. Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 143. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. L. Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 146. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. L. Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. L. Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 155. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. L. Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 155. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. L. Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 160. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. L. Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. L. Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 176. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. L. Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 205. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. The hermeneutics is, indeed, the feature which most of all characterizes Landgrebe’s thought. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. L. Landgrebe, *Der Begriff des Erlebens*, 132. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)